Serious Copula-Tensing by Kachi, Daisuke
Serious Copula-Tensing∗
Daisuke Kachi
Faculty of Liberal Arts, Saitama University
255 Shimo-okubo, Sakura-ku, Saitama-city, 338-8570, Japan
kachi@mail.saitama-u.ac.jp
ABSTRACT. M. Johnston proposed an adverbialist solution to the problem of intrinsic
change for enduring things. D. Lewis interpreted it as a way of tensing the copula. In his view,
it has the defect of replacing the having simpliciter of a property by the standing in a triadic
relation to a property and a time, and so is threatened by Bradley’s Regress. I agree with Lewis
on requiring the having a property to be non-relational, while I disagree with him on restricting
it to the having simpliciter. I tense the copula non-relationally and yet more seriously than
Johnston, by characterizing tense as a copulative de re modality concerning endurance, which
I relate to R. Taylor’s ‘pure becoming’. I will show that my way gives a better solution to the
problem of intrinsic change than those by other endurantists, because of its close connection
to an account of tense, endurance and becoming.
1 Johnston’s Solution to the Problem of Intrinsic
Change
Johnston solves (or dissolves) the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things by
applying what he calls ‘eponymous solution to the problem of modal variation’1. He
rephrases the statement ‘Sam is fat in the world v but he is thin in the world v* .’ to
‘Sam is vly fat but he is v*ly thin.’, reviving the eponymous meaning of modality as
‘the ways or modes in which things are related to properties’, which are often expressed
by adverbs. Analogously, in his view, the statement ‘Sam is fat at the time t but he is
thin at the time t*.’ should be rephrased to ‘Sam is tly fat but he is t*ly thin.’, because
temporal qualifiers in reports of change are typically adverbs which modify the copula
of predication.
According to Johnston, the problem of intrinsic change looked like a problem only
because we forgot about the possibility of relativizing the instantiation relation to a
time. If only we relativize it, we need neither of employing temporal parts, treating
a property as a relation to time, nor understanding temporal qualifiers as sentence-
formers on sentences. Consequently he stands against both perdurantists and presen-
tists.
? Reprinted from Interdisciplinary Ontology, vol.5, pp. 67-73, Japan Open Research Center for
Logic and Formal Ontology, 2012.
1 [Johnston 1987]
D. Lewis, who is a perdurantist, characterized Johnston’s solution as a way of
tensing the copula2. Though he is allied with Johnston in opposing to the presentist
solution because he thinks that it rejects persistence altogether, he also criticizes John-
ston’s solution for the reason that it replaces the having simpliciter of a property by
the standing in a triadic relation to a property and a time, and so is threatened by
Bradley’s Regress. On the other hand, the presentists like T. Merricks and M. Hincliff
accused both Lewis and Johnston of sharing the view of eternalism, while they are
allied with Lewis in respecting the having simpliciter of a property3
Basically I support Johnston’s way of holding endurantism by tensing the copula.
However, I agree with Lewis on requiring the copula of predication to be non-relational.
At the same time I have more sympathy with presentists than Johnston and Lewis in
taking tense seriously, while I am inclined to reject the presentism (at least its strong
version) itself for the same reason as Lewis. In the following, firstly I enumerate a
few adequacy conditions for a serious tensing. Next I try to satisfy these conditions,
by characterizing tense as a copulative de re modality concerning endurance and by
understanding endurance with R. Taylor’s concept of pure becoming4. Lastly I show
that it solves the problem of intrinsic change in a better way than other endurantists’
ways.
2 Tense as a Copulative de re Modality of
Endurance
I would like to set three adequacy conditions for a desirable serious tensing:
(1) ontological irreducibility of tense
(2) some ontological privilege of the present
(3) metaphysically fundamental asymmetry between the past and the future
I side with presentists by holding (1) and (2). As for (2), however, I do not necessarily
insist on either the exclusive existence nor the absoluteness of the present. I would be
satisfied if there remained some ontological superiority to the past and the future.
On the other hand, I am more ambitious than presentists in holding (3). Though
‘metaphysically fundamental’ is ambiguous, I at least require it to be non-empirical,
and so the contingent asymmetry brought about by e.g. the causal indetermination of
the future or the future increment of entropy would not be enough.
Johnston’s copula-tensing, as characterized by Lewis, does not satisfy any of these
conditions and so it is a kind of ‘surface’ copula-tensing. Instead I replace it with
a more serious copula-tensing by characterizing tense as a copulative de re modality
concerning endurance. This characterization consists of the following theses:
(a) The proposition that takes an endurant as its subject has the form ‘S-(tense, t)-P’,
where ‘S’, ‘(tense, t)’ and ‘P’ respectively stand for a subject, a copula, which is a
2 [Lewis 2002]
3 [Merricks 1994] [Hincliff 1996]
4 [Taylor 1991] pp.80-87.
temporally modified tense, and a predicate. So e.g. ‘John was bent at t.’ is analyzed
as ‘John-(past, t)-bent’5.
(b) A tensed copula represents a kind of temporal mode of instantiation. It is a de
re modality sui generis concerning endurance. Consequently there is no having
simpliciter of a property by an endurant. It always has a property with a temporal
mode.
(c) Each of the past, the present and the future endurance is respectively a necessary,
an actual, and a possible endurance in some temporal sense.
‘A temporally modified tense’ in (a) corresponds to Johnston’s modifying the copula
of predication. He reified the copula as the ‘relation’ of instantiation, while I keep it
unreduced as a ‘mode’ of instantiation. Though the copula with a temporal modification
looks awkward, I take the past and future tense in general as a kind of ‘determinable’
mode to which a temporal modification gives their ‘determinate’6. As a result, both
the past tense and the future tense are differentiated infinitely.
In (b) I reject the requirement for the having simpliciter of a property. As S.
Haslanger points out, it is interesting that both perdurantists and presentists com-
plain against qualified instantiation7. Lewis seems to suppose the having simpliciter to
be atemporal mode of instantiation, in which case, serious tensors should happily deny
it, as E. J. Lowe suggests8. Merricks, as a presentist, takes it to be of the present tense
and requires other modes of instantiation to be ‘analyzed’ by it9. I wonder if it may
not be too strong a requirement presupposing the validity of presentism; other modes
just being ‘related’ to the present tense might be enough. Though E. Sosa also opposes
to the exuberance of temporal exemplification, he concedes that it might be arguable
that such an exuberance is only just, and a true reflection of reality10. So do I argue.
My adequacy conditions of serious tensing (2) and (3) are satisfied by (c). The actu-
ality of the present makes it more privileged to the past and the future, at least to the
degree in which the actuality is superior to other modalities in some sense. Moreover,
the modal asymmetry between necessity and possibility guarantees the metaphysically
fundamental asymmetry between the past and the future. However, you may wonder
in what sense the past tense and the future tense represent necessity and possibility
respectively. What do I mean by a necessary endurance and a possible one? These are
what I would explicate in the next section.
5 The way of giving a temporal modification is variable according to the context. As for the
complex tenses, I adopt Lowe’s way of metalinguistic reconstruction([Lowe 1998], p.94.).
6 C. D. Broad also differentiated the past and future tense similarly, though his characterization
of tense is different from mine([Broad 1938] I.35, 1.21.). T. Crane also referred to the deter-
minates of a ‘mode’ of perception, though the topic is totally different([Crane 2009] p.489.).
7 [Haslanger 2003] p.346.
8 [Lowe 1988] p.73.
9 [Merricks 1994] p.169f.
10 [Sosa 1979] pp.36-38.
3 Endurance as Pure Becoming
The idea of taking the copula as the expression of modality is not new. R.Patterson
interprets Aristotle’s modality as copulative11. J. S. Mill treated tense as a typical
modality and insisted on categorizing it corresponding to the copula12. In the contem-
porary philosophy, C. McGinn proposed to view modality as a copula modifier13. T.
Yagisawa called McGinn’s conception of modality ‘modal tense’, meaning that McGinn
viewed modality similarly to tense14.
However, I do not know of the attempt to compare the past-future pair to the
necessity-possibility pair, relating tense to endurance. To understand this connection,
firstly we should grasp the essence of an endurant. Though Lewis’s definition of en-
durance, ‘a thing endures if it persists by being wholly present at more than one time’,
is prevalent, I prefer McCall and Lowe’s definition of an endurant15:
An object endures iff (i) it lacks temporal parts, and (ii) it exists more than
one time.
Firstly I take ‘an endurant’s existence at more than one time without having tem-
poral parts’ analogously with ‘an entity’s existence in more than one world holding its
trans-world identity’. Though ‘being wholly present at more than one time’ in Lewis’s
definition is unclear and so rightly criticized by McCall and Lowe, one way of under-
standing it may be to interpret it as ‘being as one in many momentary worlds keeping
its trans-world identity,’ in contrast with ‘being as one in one four-dimensional world
with many temporal parts’. Secondly it is also crucial in their definition that an en-
durant exists in plural times or ‘moments’ rather than ‘possible worlds’. It follows that
at each moment when an endurant exists it has an ‘age’ that is increasing every mo-
ment. This aging brings about an asymmetry among moments that has no counterparts
in possible worlds.
It will be helpful here to invoke the concept of ‘pure becoming’ proposed by R.
Taylor. He took pure becoming as something’s growing older in a ‘metaphysical’ sense.
He insists that it is a purely a priori notion, a consequence of something’s simply being
in time, and so its pure becoming obtains even if it does not have any intrinsic change. In
his view every change entails pure becoming16. And I interpret that what Taylor meant
by ‘the age in a metaphysical sense’ corresponds in some way to a temporal modification
of the copula, at least at the most primitive level. That is, being ‘metaphysical’ is
realized as a kind of ‘de re’ modality in this case.
11 [Patterson 1995] p.3.
12 [Mill 1874] I.iv.2.
13 [McGinn 2000] pp.74-78.
14 [Yagisawa 2010] pp.76-80.Yagisawa took McGinn’s modality as a peculiar modal kind of ab-
stract entity, while McGinn insisted on its irreducibility. Of course I side with McGinn.
15 [Lewis 1986] p.202, [McCall and Lowe 2009] p.278.
16 Though he insists that events also become older by an endless recession into the past([Taylor
1991] p.84.), I approve such a recession only as a metaphor. Even if we could recognize the
pure becoming of events in some way, I would think that it is derived from the pure becoming
of some endurants that are related to the events.
Taking pure becoming into consideration, we can say that the moments of an en-
durant’s persistence so far are the necessary moments for the endurant to have its age
at the present moment, while the moments from now on are not. For obviously e.g.
being ten years old now (in a metaphysical sense) presupposes having become one,
two, —-,and nine years old, while it does not need becoming eleven, twelve—–years
old. Though that may be too trivial for words, triviality is often a sign of necessity.
An endurant’s past moments are, as it were, its ‘necessary moments’, while its future
moments are ‘possible moments’ for it. This necessity of the past moments makes the
past instantiation ‘real’, though no longer ‘actual’ at the present moment.
I believe that this view of the past moments makes the concept of trans-moment
identity concerning the past moments different from both Lewis’s counterpart relation
and presentists’ stipulative trans-world identity relation17. It is not either an external
nor a contingent relation like Lewis’s counterpart relation, because it is implied by
the definition of an endurant as what has an age and so is an internal and necessary
relation. Here it is crucial that the form of the predication is ‘S-(tense, t)-P’ rather
than ‘(S, t)-tense-P’, because in the latter case Lewis’s counterpart theory would seem
more reasonable.
On the other hand, it is also different from presentists’ stipulative trans-world iden-
tity because it implies a real relation about an endurant in the real and concrete
moments, in contrast with presentists’ stipulative relation between the entities in the
actual present moment and those in the abstract Ersatz moments. In my view, trans-
moment identity concerning the past moments is an internal relation, and yet it is a
source of a real relation at the same time. The past-tense predication presupposes or
‘necessitates’ the reality of the past moments, though they are not actual any more at
the present.
4 Trinity of Tense, Endurance and Becoming
To return to the problem of intrinsic change, you may wonder why I bother with
copulative modality and pure becoming. In fact, as L. Lombard says, just for solving
the problem it does not matter whether the instantiation is relational or not18. Neither
do you need serious tensing; merely the temporal modification of the tenseless copula
would be enough. However, solving the problem of intrinsic change itself is not our goal;
our most important task is to defend the endurantism by characterizing endurance
properly, for which the solution of that problem is only a necessary condition. In this
sense I approve one of Merricks’s desiderata19:
(vii) A solution should follow directly from an account of endurance.
In my view, the reality of tense and becoming is another side of the reality of en-
durance; existing at plural moments without temporal parts is existing there growing
17 I explicated the ontological difference between the trans-(possible)world identity and the trans-
moment identity in [Kachi 1999].
18 [Lombard 2003] p.181.
19 [Merricks 1994] p.174.
older in a metaphysical sense, and that sense is given by the trans-moment identity in
which the moments are a kind of becoming worlds only whose newest one is actual. In
addition, an endurant’s pure becoming gives the basis of the de re modal asymmetry
between the past and the future20. Moreover, it is crucial to relate the temporal modi-
fication, which corresponds to the (metaphysical) age of an endurant, not to a subject
but to the copula, for insisting on the genuine trans-world identity rather than Lewis’s
counterpart relation or presentists’ only stipulative identity. It is a part of the essence
of an endurant to keep its trans-moment identity by growing older in a metaphysical
sense. An endurant is an ‘agent’ in another sense that it is an entity which ages.
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